

# Who Supports Delegative Democracy?

## Evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey

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### Abstract

This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether individuals have delegative democratic attitudes—supporting strong executive power with little oversight from the legislature. Roughly up to 50 percent of voters in East Asia have delegative democratic attitudes. Our theoretical analysis suggests that delegative democratic attitudes are associated with low support for democracy, interest group dominance of policy, and the trust in national leaders. Using Asian Barometer Survey data from East Asian countries, 2001 to 2011, we confirm the hypotheses. Our findings imply that transforming a delegative democracy into a consolidated democracy requires promoting support for democracy and constraining interest group influence over policy.

**Keywords:** delegative democracy, support for democracy, interest group politics, Asianbarometer survey

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## 1. Introduction

Delegative democracy—a variant of democratic regime—operates under a general principle that an elected president governs the country as he sees fit, and his decrees substitute the legislation as the main source of policy (O'Donnell, 1994). Prevalent in developing democracies, delegative democratic attitudes do not support the legislature and judiciary because these institutions are unnecessary impediments to the authority that has been delegated to the president and his national government (O'Donnell, 1994; Larkins, 1998; Walker, 2009).

Previous studies focused on the effects of delegative democracy on democratic institutions in Latin America. Using the Latinobarometer Surveys collected from three Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua), Walker (2009) found that delegative democratic attitude differs from both liberal democratic and authoritarian attitudes.<sup>1</sup> For instance, delegative persons are more likely to use presidential performance as a yardstick for evaluating the legislature and judiciary than liberals.

With a few exceptions, however, previous research has not examined the question of why some individuals support delegative democracy—favoring unrestrained presidential governance. Using the World Values Survey (WVS) data drawn from 9 Latin America Countries, Gronke and Levitt (2005) examined individual-level variables for delegative attitudes, including, for instance, support for democracy and socioeconomic status. The WVS provides a limited measure of delegative attitudes, however (Gronke and Levitt, 2005).<sup>2</sup> In addition, although O'Donnell (1994)

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<sup>1</sup> Note that delegative democratic attitudes are not authoritarian because delegative persons delegate the full authority to the president at the ballot box in free elections. Delegative attitudes are not liberal democratic either because delegative persons subordinate checks and balances to the policy preferences of the elected president (O'Donnell, 1994; Larkins, 1998; Walker, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> The WVS asks respondents to rate "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" as a good or bad ways of governing their country. This measure could be interpreted as an authoritarian attitude as well as a delegative attitude (Gronke and Gradstein, 2005).

observed that delegative tendencies are detectable in many Asian countries, no study has empirically examined delegative democratic attitudes in Asia.

This paper builds on the literature by examining the factors influencing whether individuals have delegative democratic attitudes. We first provide a theoretical model that explains individual tendency to support delegative democracy. In spirit, our model is related to the literature that examined the effects that interest groups have in influencing public policy (e.g., Denzau and Munger, 1986; Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Chamon and Kaplan, 2013; Holcombe and Boudreaux, 2015). In these studies, legislators provide policy services to special interests, in exchange for campaign contributions (or even bribes)—to the extent that voters are less than fully informed about the policy issue (or about the legislator's activity).<sup>3</sup> For instance, local government zoning provides opportunities for rent-seeking by construction interests (Kyriacou et al., 2015).

Thus some of the voters may favor unrestrained leaders—unchecked by the legislature—who can counter the power of interest groups that control the legislature (Chong and Gradstein, 2008; Walker, 2009). Our theoretical model suggests that delegative democratic attitudes are associated with low support for democracy, interest group dominance of policy outcomes, and trust in the national government.

To test the hypotheses suggested by the model of delegative democratic attitude, we use Asianbarometer survey data from over 20,000 respondents across 10 East Asian countries for the 2001-2011 period. The countries include Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,

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<sup>3</sup> According to Denzau and Munger (1986), interest groups control vote-maximizing legislators by providing vote-producing campaign resources, but are constrained by the preferences of the voters—because interest groups seek out legislators whose geographic constituencies are in favor of a policy. The constraint may not bind, however, because voters are less than perfectly informed about the legislator's activities in serving interest groups. Thus the legislator is more likely to serve the general interest if voters are well-informed about the issue at hand.

Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Our dataset contains detailed questions on individual attitudes toward politics and economic policies. Our dataset provides more direct and diverse measures of delegative democratic attitudes than previous studies.<sup>4</sup> We measure the delegative democratic attitudes using responses to the questionnaires including (1) "If the government is constantly checked [i.e., monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things," (2) "We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things," (3) "The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure," and (4) "When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation." Depending on the measures, roughly 24 to 50 percent of respondents have delegative democratic attitudes.<sup>5</sup>

Our empirical methodology uses an ordered probit model to identify the characteristics of voters who support delegative democracy. The empirical results of this paper confirm that individuals with delegative democratic attitudes tend to (1) have low support for democracy, (2) perceive greater policy influence of interest groups, and (3) trust the national government. Delegative democratic individuals are also less likely to contact legislative representatives to deal with the problem with government policies or officials.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model that identifies the determinants of delegative democratic attitudes. In Section 3, we describe the data sources, explain our empirical strategy, and present the results. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications.

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<sup>4</sup> To measure delegative attitudes, Walker (2009) used the share of respondents who prefer democracy and would give a blank check to a savior leader who solves the problem.

<sup>5</sup> The measure refers to the percentage of respondents who either strongly agree or somewhat agree to the questionnaires.

## 2. Model of Delegative Democratic Attitudes

The intuition behind the model in this section is simple: If local representatives sell out to special interests rather than serving their voters, some of the voters may want to delegate the full authority to the president unchecked by the legislature.

Consider a legislator who serves interest groups by providing policy  $x$ . She does so with probability  $p > 0$ . Thus, with probability  $1 - p$ , the legislator provides policy  $y$  that her voters (that is, geographic constituency) favor.<sup>6</sup> The idea is that politicians sell out to interest groups but are constrained by the preferences of the voters (Denzau and Munger, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Prat, 2002).

Let a voter  $i$  receive  $u_i(x)$  from the policy service to the interest groups and  $u_i(y)$  from the service to the geographic constituency. Thus, the voter  $i$  gains expected utility  $p \cdot u_i(x) + (1 - p) \cdot u_i(y)$ . We assume that  $u_i(y) > u_i(x)$ .<sup>7</sup>

Against the legislative outcomes, the voter  $i$  may support delegative democracies, in which the president's decrees replace the legislator's activities as the source of public policy (O'Donnell, 1994; Larkins, 1998; Walker, 2009). The president (and his national government) reduces the probability of interest group dominance over policy—say, from  $p$  to  $q (< p)$ . This allows voter  $i$  to capture a higher level of expected utility  $q \cdot u_i(x) + (1 - q) \cdot u_i(y)$ , but incurs the implicit cost  $\lambda_i$  of supporting the leader with unchecked authority. As the level of  $\lambda_i$  increases, the voter assigns a

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<sup>6</sup> Examples of policy  $x$  are pork projects (such as defense contracts for a firm located in the district), subsidies and tariff protection, special provisions in legislation, and regulatory exceptions (Baron, 1994; Chamon and Kaplan, 2013). Policy  $y$  may include casework, dealing with the bureaucracy on behalf of voters, and other individual services (Denzau and Munger, 1986). Note that  $p$  can be interpreted as the share of effort that the legislator allocates to producing policy  $x$ .

<sup>7</sup> Normally we expect that  $u_i(x) > 0$  because interest groups tend to buy legislators whose geographic constituencies are in favor of a policy (Denzau and Munger, 1986). It is possible, however, that  $u_i(x) < 0$  if voter  $i$  is opposed to the policy  $x$ .

higher value to democracy (e.g., checks and balances).<sup>8</sup>

Thus, voter  $i$  rationally prefers delegative democratic outcomes to legislative outcomes if and only if

$$(1) \quad p \cdot u_i(x) + (1-p) \cdot u_i(y) < q \cdot u_i(x) + (1-q) \cdot u_i(y) - \lambda_i + \delta_i,$$

where  $\delta_i$  denotes the non-policy bias of voter  $i$  in favor of the president, including an evaluation of the leader's personalities, competency, and reputation for keeping promises (Tridimas and Winer, 2005).

To see the delegative attitudes more clearly, we rearrange (1):

$$(2) \quad \delta_i + (p-q) \cdot [u_i(y) - u_i(x)] > \lambda_i.$$

The left-hand side of inequality (2) consists of two terms: the non-policy preference for the leader  $\delta_i$  and the net gain in expected utility from policy under delegative democracy (that is, the increase in the likelihood of having policy  $y$ , or  $p - q$ , multiplied by the extent to which the voter prefers policy  $y$  to  $x$ , or  $u_i(y) - u_i(x)$ ). For a voter with delegative attitude, these two terms combined must be greater than her support for democracy  $\lambda_i$  on the right-hand side.<sup>9</sup>

To illustrate the comparative statistics predictions of the model, we assume that the distribution of  $\delta_i$  is uniform on  $[0, \delta_i^{\max}]$ . From (2), the probability  $F$  that voter  $i$  supports delegative democracy is given by

$$(3) \quad F = \text{prob} \{ \delta_i > \lambda_i - (p-q) \cdot [u_i(y) - u_i(x)] \} \\ = 1 - \frac{1}{\delta_i^{\max}} \cdot \{ \lambda_i - (p-q) \cdot [u_i(y) - u_i(x)] \}.$$

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<sup>8</sup> Note in our model that interest groups are unable to buy the national leader. O'Donnell (1994) argues that "the president isolates himself from most political institutions and organized interests."

<sup>9</sup> Note that in some developing democracies, non-policy factors (that is,  $\delta_i$  and  $\lambda_i$ ) may influence voters' attitude toward delegative democracy more than policy factors (that is,  $p - q$ ).

Equation (3) indicates that, given  $u_i(y) - u_i(x)$ , voter  $i$ 's attitude towards delegative democracy is to take the reduced form  $F = F(\lambda_i^-, p^+ - q)$ , where each argument influences  $i$ 's decision to support the unrestrained leader. Specifically, a voter with a higher level of support for democracy (i.e., higher  $\lambda_i$ ) is less likely to support delegative democracy, other things equal. This is consistent with Walker (2009), who found that a majority of individuals who support democracy tend to express a liberal democratic attitude rather than a delegative attitude.

On the contrary, an increase in  $(p - q)$  increases the tendency of a voter to support delegative democracy. Note that a distance between  $p$  and  $q$  reflects the voter's political information about the extent to which (1) interest groups dominate government policies (i.e., higher  $p$ ) and (2) the president restrains the power of interest groups (i.e., lower  $q$ ).

Holding  $q$  constant, for instance, greater policy dominance of interest groups (higher  $p$ ) increases the support for delegative democracy. Voters with higher  $p$  are also likely to have *low* confidence in their local representatives—because they sell out to special interests. Note that, on the contrary, liberal democratic persons are more likely to ascribe the performance of their representative to the representative herself rather than interest groups (Walker, 2009; Booth and Seligson, 2005).

Similarly, holding  $p$  constant, a delegative voter expects a larger reduction in interest group dominance under delegative democracy (lower  $q$ ). This implies that delegative persons have a higher level of confidence in the president (and the national government) who can counter the power of interest groups over the legislature.

Thus, we have the following hypotheses:

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \frac{\partial F}{\partial \text{ support for democracy}} &< 0, \\ \frac{\partial F}{\partial \text{ interest group dominance}} &> 0. \\ \frac{\partial F}{\partial \text{ trust in government}} &> 0. \end{aligned}$$

In summary, our simple model identifies distinctive characteristics of delegative democratic individuals, including low support for democracy, high level of (perceived) interest group dominance, and high trust in national government. Our empirical analysis in the next section confirms these hypotheses.

### 3. Estimation Evidence

#### 3.1. Empirical Model and Data Description

To provide empirical evidence for the hypotheses suggested by our theory, we estimate the following equation.

$$(5) \quad y_i^* = D_i' \beta + X_{ict}' \gamma + \varepsilon_i,$$

where subscripts  $i$ ,  $c$ , and  $t$  denote the individual, country, and year, respectively. The latent variable  $y_i^*$  represents  $i$ 's tendency to support delegative democracy.  $D_i$  is the vector of main determinants of the delegative democratic attitudes, including individual  $i$ 's tendency to support democracy (-); the perceived level of interest group dominance (+); the level of trust in the national government (+); and the confidence in local representatives with respect to government policies (-), with the predicted signs of  $\beta$  in the parentheses.

The vector  $X_{it}$  represents a set of control variables including age, gender, education level, employment status, marital status, subjective social economic status, tendency to obey authority,



tendency to trust others, perceived level of corruption, real GDP per capita, country dummy, and time dummy. Vector  $\varepsilon_i$  is the error term.

We use the data from the Asian Barometer Surveys (ABS) conducted in 2001-2003, 2005-2008, and 2010-2011. The ABS conducts a comparative survey of citizens (15 years or older) for their attitudes and opinion about politics and democracy as well as their socioeconomic and demographic information.<sup>10</sup> The dataset covers more than 50,000 respondents from 13 East Asian countries: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.<sup>11</sup> Because this paper examines citizens' attitudes toward political institutions in the democratic setting, we restrict the sample countries to either emerging or established democracies based on Polity IV; that is, we exclude China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. In addition, because this paper focuses on *voters'* attitudes toward delegative democracy, we limit our sample to the respondents over voting age and exclude those who did not vote in the most recent election.<sup>12</sup> Our sample includes about 20,000 respondents.

Delegative democratic attitudes,  $y_i^*$ , are measured by using the following questionnaires in the ABS:

- Question 1: "If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things."
- Question 2: "We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things."

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<sup>10</sup> In each of the 13 countries, a national research team administers a country-wide face-to-face survey and compiles the micro-level data under a common research framework and with standardized survey instruments as well as research methodology.

<sup>11</sup> Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia were included in 2005-2008 and 2010-2012.

<sup>12</sup> We also exclude the respondents over age 80 because they represent only 1.5 percent of the sample and are less likely to be politically opined.

- Question 3: "The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure."
- Question 4: "When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation."

The dependent variables take on integer values with the following scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, and 4 = strongly agree. Table 1 present the shares of respondents who either "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" to the four questionnaires by country and interview year. On average, about 50, 24, 35, and 40 percent of respondents in our sample countries had delegative democratic attitudes based on Questions 1 through 4, respectively. This shows that delegative attitudes are widespread in Asian democracies. Note that Question 2 may also refer to an authoritarian attitude because delegative persons delegate the authority to the president in free elections. Question 4 reflects the idea that delegative attitudes are more common in times of crisis (O'Donnell, 1994; Weyland, 1996).

[Table 1 here]

We measure the main characteristics of the delegative democratic individuals  $D_i$  by using the following questionnaires:

- democratic : "To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now?" 1. Complete dictatorship – 10. Complete democracy.
- powerfew : "The nation is run by a powerful few and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it." 1. Strongly disagree – 4. Strongly agree.

- Olson: "Could you identify the three most important organizations or formal groups you belong to?" Share of respondents (in the same age cohort) who belong to the Olson-type organizations.<sup>13</sup>
- trustgov : "How much trust do you have in the national government?" 1. None at all – 4. A great deal
- contact : "In the past three years, have you never, once, or more than once contacted elected officials or legislative representative because of personal, family, or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies?" Never = 0, once = 1, more than once = 2.

These variables are measures of the support for democracy (democratic), the level of interest group dominance (powerfew and Olson), the trust in national government (trustgov), and the confidence in local representatives (contact). Because powerfew is available only for the 2001-2003 period, and Olson only for the 2005-2008 and 2010-2011 periods, we report the results in separate regressions. Note that contact indirectly captures the confidence in local representatives.<sup>14</sup>

In estimating equation (5), we need to consider potential endogeneity problems caused by omitted variables. For instance, if a respondent tends to obey authority, then it affects not only the tendency to support the strong leader but the tendency to support democracy (democratic). We solve this problem of endogeneity by adding the authoritative tendency (auth)—measured

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<sup>13</sup> Olson-type organizations include political parties, labor unions, farmer unions, professional organization, business association, producer cooperative, consumer cooperative, alumni association, candidate support organization, can association, hometown association, and peer group.

<sup>14</sup> [The ABS does not provide a direct measure for the confidence in local representatives.](#)

by the responses to "Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask." Another endogeneity concern is that the tendency to support delegative democracy might be associated with the levels of social trust and corruption which potentially affect the trust in government (trustgov). To control for this concern, we add the tendency to trust others (most)—measured by the responses to "Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted?" We also include the perceived level of corruption in the society (witness)—measured by the response to "Have you or anyone you know personally witnessed an act of corruption or bribe-taking by a politician or government official in the past year?"

Other control variables reflect previous research on delegative attitudes and democratic support (e.g., Gronke and Levitt 2005; Walker 2009). The variables include age (age), gender (male), education level (college), employment status (unemp), marital status (married), subjective social status (social), and real GDP per capita (GDP per capita<sub>c</sub>).<sup>15</sup> We also include country fixed effects to control for the time-invariant country-level characteristics. All the variables described in this subsection are summarized in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

In estimating equation (5), we use the ordered probit estimator which takes into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variables. We use robust standard errors clustered by country because random disturbances are potentially correlated within countries. In addition, to obtain representative results, we use information on the weight in the survey in implementing the ordered probit.

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<sup>15</sup> Real GDP per capita is collected from Penn World Table 8.1.

### 3.2. Estimation Results

Table 3 reports ordered probit results. The dependent variable is the response to Question 1: "If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things." The estimated coefficients in column (1) of Table 3 imply that support for democracy (democratic) has a negative and significant association with the probability of supporting delegative democracy. On the contrary, trust in national government (trustgov) has a robust positive effect on the tendency to support delegative democracy. In addition, respondents who contacted elected representatives more than once (contact2) are less likely to support delegative democracy. Contacting elected representatives just once (contact1) is not significantly related to the support for delegative democracy, however. This simply means that direct lobbying is more effective when voters have an ongoing relationship with local politicians, and such voters would not delegate the authority to the president. Thus, consistent with our hypotheses, delegative persons are less supportive of democracy, more likely to trust their national governments, and less likely to contact legislative representatives.

[Table 3 here]

Among the control variables, authoritative tendency (auth) has a positive association with the tendency to support delegative democracy, while trust in others (most) is negatively associated with delegative democratic attitudes. In addition, male gender, college education, and real GDP per capita (at the country level) have a robust negative effect on delegative attitudes. Note that college education implies greater political knowledge, which is associated with less support for delegative democracy. The coefficients on other control variables are statistically insignificant.

Columns 2 through 5 of Table 3 show the marginal effects of voter characteristics on the

probability of choosing each class of the dependent variable  $y^*$ : strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree. The marginal effect analysis shows that the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest in column 1 are not driven by the impact of voter characteristics for any one class—for instance, the probability of choosing "strongly agree."

In terms of magnitude of the effects, evaluated at the mean, a change in support for democracy from complete dictatorship to complete democracy reduces the probability of choosing "somewhat agree" to delegative democracy by about 2.2 percentage points. On the contrary, an increase in trust in national government from "not very much" to "quite a lot" increases the probability of choosing "somewhat agree" to delegative democracy by 2.3 percentage points. In addition, contacting legislative representatives more than once reduces the probability of choosing "somewhat agree" to delegative democracy by 1.4 percentage points. Note for comparison that having a college degree reduces the probability of somewhat agreeing to delegative democracy by 5.7 percentage points. Given that obtaining college education requires substantial costs, the effects of three variables of interest (democratic, trustgov, and contact2) on delegative democracy are not trivial.

Probit results in Table 3 show the determinants of just one measure of delegative democratic attitudes. In Panels A through C of Table 4, we report ordered probit results using three alternative dependent variables: Questions 2 to 4. Throughout the panels, the coefficients (and marginal effects) of democratic, trustgov, and contact2 have expected signs and are statistically significant in most cases.

[Table 4 here]

In Table 5, we add the measures of interest group influence on policy, powerfew (Panel A)

and Olson (Panel B), as explanatory variables for delegative attitudes. Note that the two variables are available for wave 1 (2001-2003) and for waves 2 and 3 (2005-2008 and 2010-2011), respectively. In Panel A, voters who believe that the nation is run by powerful interest groups (i.e., higher powerfew) tend to support delegative democracy. Similarly, in Panel B, a larger membership in the Olson-type organizations (i.e., higher Olson) increases the tendency to support delegative democracy.

Thus, we confirm that interest group control over local representatives significantly influences the delegative democratic attitudes.

[Table 5 here]

Table 6 shows ordered probit results using a subsample. Types of regime potentially influence voters' attitudes towards delegative democracy to the extent that the adoption of regime is a political decision that reflects voters' preferences. For instance, delegative persons in democratic regimes may respond differently to determinant variables than delegative persons in anocratic regimes (which conceptually lies between autocracies and democracies). Panels A through C thus limit the countries into democracies.<sup>16</sup> Throughout the panels, coefficients on all the main determinants (democratic, trustgov, contact2, powerfew, and Olson) have expected signs and are statistically significant in most cases.

[Table 6 here]

In addition, previous research implies that delegative attitudes and confidence in legislatures might be a pair of concepts that oppose each other (e.g., O'Donnell, 1994). Table 7 uses the trust in parliament as a dependent variable instead of delegative attitudes. Contrary to the case in

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<sup>16</sup> This means dropping the countries that Polity IV classifies as anocracies: Thailand (2010-2011), Singapore, Cambodia, and Malaysia.

delegative attitudes, trust in parliament is positively associated with support for democracy and contacting legislative representatives, and negatively associated with interest group dominance (powerfew). Similar to the case in delgative attitudes, however, trust in parliament is positively related to trust in national government. One interpretation for this finding is that delegative persons might use the performance of the national government as a yardstick for evaluating the legislature (Walker, 2009). These results are consistent with Gronke and Levitt (2005), who claimed that the underlying structures of delegative attitudes and trust in legislatures are only partially related to each other.

[Table 7 here]

In summary, we confirm our hypotheses that delegative democratic individuals are less likely to support democracy and contact legislative representatives, and more likely to perceive interest group dominance and trust the national government.

#### **4. Concluding Remarks**

The existing literature has mainly focused on the consequences of delegative democracy. The literature on what influences delegative democratic attitudes, however, has been lagging behind. This paper has examined the determinants of delegative democratic attitudes that support strong executive power unchecked by the legislature.

Using the Asian Barometer Survey data from East Asian countries, 2001 to 2011, we confirm the hypotheses that delegative democratic individuals are less likely to support democracy and contact legislative representatives, and more likely to perceive interest group dominance and trust the national government. Our results are robust to alternative measures of delegative attitudes and controlling for various individual characteristics.



A high level of support for unrestrained executive power is known to undermine horizontal institutional accountability—a necessary condition for consolidated democracies (Walker, 2009). The findings of this study imply that reducing delegative democratic attitudes requires promoting support for democracy at the individual level and preventing interest group dominance over public policy.

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## Appendix. Empirical Methodology

Dependent variable  $y_i^*$  in (5) is observed in the following way:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq \mu_1 \\ 2 & \text{if } \mu_1 < y_i^* \leq \mu_2 \\ 3 & \text{if } \mu_2 < y_i^* \leq \mu_3 \\ 4 & \text{if } \mu_3 \leq y_i^* \end{cases}$$

where  $\mu$  represents the cut-off points between successive alternatives.

Thus the probability of observing  $y_i$  may be expressed as

$$\Pr(y_i = j) = \Pr(\mu_{j-1} < \beta x + u \leq \mu_j) = F(\mu_j - \beta x) - F(\mu_{j-1} - \beta x), \quad j = 1, 2, 3, 4,$$

where F has a normal distribution.

Note that the impact of a variable  $x$  on the probability of choosing the option  $y_i = j$  depends on the estimated coefficient and the value of  $x$ . If  $x$  is a continuous variable, the marginal effect of  $x$  is determined by the following equations:

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(y=1)}{\partial x} = -F(\widehat{\beta}'x)\widehat{\beta}$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(y=2)}{\partial x} = [F(-\widehat{\beta}'x) - F(\widehat{\mu}_1 - \widehat{\beta}'x)]\widehat{\beta}$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(y=3)}{\partial x} = [F(\widehat{\mu}_1 - \widehat{\beta}'x) - F(\widehat{\mu}_2 - \widehat{\beta}'x)]\widehat{\beta}$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(y=4)}{\partial x} = F(\widehat{\mu}_2 - \widehat{\beta}'x)\widehat{\beta}$$

If  $x$  is a dummy variable, we examine the predicted probabilities (using  $X$  at the sample means) for each realization of  $x$ . For example, we expect a decrease in the probability of a respondent reporting that

she is 'somewhat agree' to delegative democracy ( $y_i^* = 3$ ) when her *democrat*<sub>i</sub> tendency increases by one unit. Similarly, we expect that the respondent is less likely to report she is 'strongly agree' to delegative democracy ( $y_i^* = 4$ ) when *democrat*<sub>i</sub> tendency increases.

Table 1: Delegative democratic attitudes across countries and interview years (weighted) (%)

Country	Interview year	Dep 1	Dep 2	Dep 3	Dep 4
Japan	2003	37.9	13.2	31.9	29.1
	2007	36.9	16.8	48.4	47.7
	2011	36.1	14.5		30.0
Korea	2003	46.1	16.3	23.8	27.1
	2006	36.8	12.0	20.5	22.2
	2011	36.8	17.3		27.0
Mongolia	2006	60.0	64.1	48.9	52.5
	2010	54.5	55.3		35.1
Philippines	2002	49.4	31.9	38.6	38.2
	2006	55.3	38.0	46.3	45.0
	2010	63.8	33.0		34.3
Taiwan	2001	70.4	20.8	16.2	23.2
	2006	63.3	18.4	11.9	15.3
	2010	58.7	15.9		27.6
Thailand	2002	52.5	22.6	56.6	61.7
	2006	52.4	24.0	50.9	65.5
	2010	45.2	24.4		58.7
Indonesia	2006	37.3	10.0	12.4	15.7
	2011	38.1	15.1		35.7
Singapore	2005	50.7	8.9	53.6	70.2
	2011	46.5	9.9		50.1
Cambodia	2011	52.6	20.8		46.5
Malaysia	2007	57.5	32.6	33.8	46.8
	2011	48.8	34.7		43.6

Notes. Delegative democratic attitudes are defined as the shares of respondents who either "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree" to the following measures. Dep 1: If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. Dep 2: We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. Dep 3: The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if have to ignore the established procedure. Dep 4: When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

Table 2: Summary statistics (weighted)

Variable	Description	Mean	S.D.
Dep1	If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.	2.46	0.83
Dep2	We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.	1.96	0.88
Dep3	The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if have to ignore the established procedure.	2.21	0.87
Dep4	When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.	2.22	0.90
democratic	To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now? 1. Complete dictatorship – 10. Complete democracy.	8.39	1.84
powerfew	The nation is run by a powerful few and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it. 1. Strongly disagree – 4. Strongly agree	2.62	0.89
Olson	Share of respondents (in the same age cohort) who belong to the Olson-type organizations.	0.25	0.19
contact	In the past three years, have you never, once, or more than once done the following because of personal, family, or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies? Contacted elected officials or legislative representative. Never=0, once=1, more than once=2	0.24	0.61
trust in government	How much trust do you have in the national government? None at all = 1, Not very much = 2, Quite a lot of trust = 3, A great deal = 4	2.47	0.82
trust in parliament	How much trust do you have in the Parliament? None at all = 1, Not very much = 2, Quite a lot of trust = 3, A great deal = 4	2.33	0.85
unemp	Unemployed = 1	0.31	0.46
college	Bachelor's degree = 1	0.16	0.36
married	Married = 1	0.84	0.37
social	Subjective social status Lowest status=1, ..., highest status=5	2.86	0.91
age	Calculated by using the birth year.	44.43	14.52
gender	Male = 1	0.49	0.50
most	General speaking, would you say "Most people can be trusted" or "that you must be very careful in dealing with people?"	0.26	0.44
auth	Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. None at all = 1, Not very much = 2, Quite a lot of trust = 3, A great deal = 4	2.37	0.90
witness	Have you or anyone you know personally witnessed an act of corruption or bribe-taking by a politician or government official in the past year? Witnessed=1	0.23	0.42
ln(GDP per capita)	GDP per capita in natural logs	-0.20	2.21

Table 3: Determinants of delegative democratic attitudes

Dependent variable: If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5
	dependent var.	marginal effects			
		strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	somewhat agree	strongly agree
democratic	-0.00924** (0.00446)	0.00184** (0.000877)	0.00184** (0.000896)	-0.00220** (0.00110)	-0.00149** (0.000678)
trust gov	0.0947*** (0.0230)	-0.0189*** (0.00457)	-0.0189*** (0.00512)	0.0225*** (0.00620)	0.0153*** (0.00351)
contact1	0.0420 (0.0299)	-0.00821 (0.00587)	-0.00855 (0.00622)	0.00982 (0.00716)	0.00694 (0.00493)
contact2	-0.0580** (0.0287)	0.0119* (0.00642)	0.0112** (0.00530)	-0.0140** (0.00687)	-0.00905* (0.00483)
auth	0.0886*** (0.0219)	-0.0177*** (0.00367)	-0.0176*** (0.00526)	0.0210*** (0.00604)	0.0143*** (0.00297)
most	-0.0782*** (0.0215)	0.0160*** (0.00529)	0.0152*** (0.00402)	-0.0189*** (0.00554)	-0.0123*** (0.00378)
witness	0.0304 (0.0393)	-0.00601 (0.00793)	-0.00610 (0.00779)	0.00717 (0.00898)	0.00495 (0.00673)
unemp	-0.00271 (0.0198)	0.000542 (0.00398)	0.000540 (0.00391)	-0.000645 (0.00469)	-0.000437 (0.00320)
college	-0.225*** (0.0579)	0.0489*** (0.0138)	0.0403*** (0.0113)	-0.0563*** (0.0166)	-0.0329*** (0.00831)
married	0.00175 (0.0193)	-0.000349 (0.00386)	-0.000348 (0.00384)	0.000416 (0.00459)	0.000282 (0.00311)
agea	-0.00503 (0.00508)	0.00100 (0.00102)	0.00100 (0.00101)	-0.00119 (0.00121)	-0.000811 (0.000809)
agea2	5.69e-05 (5.30e-05)	-1.14e-05 (1.05e-05)	-1.13e-05 (1.06e-05)	1.35e-05 (1.27e-05)	9.17e-06 (8.36e-06)
male	-0.0850*** (0.0181)	0.0169*** (0.00383)	0.0169*** (0.00441)	-0.0201*** (0.00512)	-0.0137*** (0.00311)
ln(GDP per capita)	-0.558** (0.227)	0.111** (0.0537)	0.111** (0.0438)	-0.133** (0.0543)	-0.0900** (0.0434)
Observations	19,900	19,900	19,900	19,900	19,900

All columns include country and year dummies. For brevity, subjective social status variables are not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 4: Alternative measures of delegative democratic attitudes

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5
	dependent var.	marginal effects			
		strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	somewhat agree	strongly agree
Panel A. dep.: We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.					
democratic	-0.0589*** (0.0111)	0.0214*** (0.00406)	-0.00400*** (0.000837)	-0.0110*** (0.00235)	-0.00636*** (0.00148)
trust gov	0.0356 (0.0241)	-0.0129 (0.00861)	0.00242 (0.00169)	0.00664 (0.00465)	0.00385 (0.00237)
contact1	0.00672 (0.0534)	-0.00243 (0.0193)	0.000448 (0.00350)	0.00125 (0.00998)	0.000729 (0.00582)
contact2	-0.0739*** (0.0226)	0.0271*** (0.00807)	-0.00585** (0.00230)	-0.0136*** (0.00438)	-0.00760*** (0.00189)
Observations	20,490	20,490	20,490	20,490	20,490
Panel B. dep.: The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure.					
democratic	-0.0201 (0.0150)	0.00558 (0.00406)	0.00175 (0.00144)	-0.00479 (0.00375)	-0.00254 (0.00176)
trust gov	0.131*** (0.0203)	-0.0362*** (0.00521)	-0.0114*** (0.00318)	0.0311*** (0.00585)	0.0165*** (0.00319)
contact1	0.0294 (0.0501)	-0.00804 (0.0136)	-0.00270 (0.00490)	0.00696 (0.0121)	0.00378 (0.00647)
contact2	-0.0373** (0.0168)	0.0105** (0.00436)	0.00302* (0.00170)	-0.00888* (0.00458)	-0.00460*** (0.00149)
Observations	11,491	11,491	11,491	11,491	11,491
Panel C. dep.: When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law.					
democratic	-0.0152*** (0.00574)	0.00455*** (0.00156)	0.00119* (0.000619)	-0.00362** (0.00150)	-0.00212*** (0.000695)
trust gov	0.0805*** (0.0160)	-0.0241*** (0.00468)	-0.00629*** (0.00206)	0.0192*** (0.00445)	0.0112*** (0.00236)
contact1	-0.0424 (0.0328)	0.0129 (0.00995)	0.00303 (0.00233)	-0.0101 (0.00796)	-0.00575 (0.00431)
contact2	-0.0372** (0.0181)	0.0113* (0.00602)	0.00271*** (0.00105)	-0.00889** (0.00417)	-0.00507* (0.00286)
Observations	20,152	20,152	20,152	20,152	20,152

Coefficients on other explanatory variables are not reported. All columns include country and year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 5: Effect of interest group dominance on delegative attitudes

VARIABLES	Dep 1	Dep 2	Dep 3	Dep 4
Panel A. Interest group dominance is powerfew				
democratic	-0.000534 (0.0210)	-0.0900*** (0.0193)	-0.0491*** (0.0101)	-0.0401*** (0.0152)
trust gov	0.0779*** (0.0292)	0.100*** (0.0375)	0.165*** (0.0338)	0.0674** (0.0293)
contact1	0.00366 (0.0754)	0.0620 (0.152)	0.121 (0.106)	0.0616 (0.0540)
contact2	-0.0170 (0.0418)	-0.0591 (0.0636)	-0.0856 (0.0783)	0.0429 (0.131)
powerfew	0.129** (0.0605)	0.0665* (0.0376)	0.0845** (0.0358)	0.0559 (0.0475)
Observations	4,207	4,263	4,219	4,256
Panel B. Interest group dominance is Olson				
democratic	-0.0102** (0.00421)	-0.0533*** (0.0102)	-0.00917 (0.0189)	-0.0102 (0.00697)
trust gov	0.0993*** (0.0238)	0.0207 (0.0234)	0.114*** (0.0315)	0.0848*** (0.0183)
contact1	0.0471 (0.0295)	-0.00263 (0.0419)	0.00423 (0.0312)	-0.0579* (0.0349)
contact2	-0.0530* (0.0291)	-0.0735*** (0.0206)	-0.0330* (0.0191)	-0.0495* (0.0290)
Olson	0.0471 (0.152)	0.120* (0.0682)	0.629** (0.276)	0.379*** (0.0647)
Observations	15,666	16,196	7,245	15,868

Coefficients on other explanatory variables are not reported. All columns include country and year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



Table 6: Determinants of delegative attitudes in democratic regimes

VARIABLES	Dep 1	Dep 2	Dep 3	Dep 4
Panel A. Entire sample				
democratic	-0.00656 (0.00544)	-0.0637*** (0.0125)	-0.0181 (0.0168)	-0.0187*** (0.00462)
trust gov	0.0984*** (0.0269)	0.0498** (0.0254)	0.141*** (0.0190)	0.0669*** (0.0137)
contact1	0.0317 (0.0283)	0.0119 (0.0628)	0.0244 (0.0586)	-0.0414 (0.0319)
contact2	-0.0609* (0.0359)	-0.0786** (0.0354)	-0.0417** (0.0203)	-0.0464** (0.0201)
Observations	16,668	17,135	10,337	16,902
Panel B. Adding powerfew (Wave 1)				
powerfew	0.129** (0.0605)	0.0665* (0.0376)	0.0845** (0.0358)	0.0559 (0.0475)
Observations	4,207	4,263	4,219	4,256
Panel C. Adding Olson membership (Waves 2 and 3)				
Olson	0.138 (0.170)	0.191*** (0.0682)	0.691** (0.316)	0.369*** (0.130)
Observations	12,434	12,841	6,091	12,618

Coefficients on other explanatory variables are not reported. All columns include country and year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 7: Determinants of trust in parliament

Dependent variable: How much trust do you have in the Parliament?

	1	2	3
democratic	0.0163* (0.00833)	-0.00552 (0.00998)	0.0209*** (0.00799)
trust gov	0.782*** (0.0666)	0.663*** (0.0896)	0.814*** (0.0733)
contact1	0.0607*** (0.0231)	0.179 (0.144)	0.0454 (0.0342)
contact2	0.0381** (0.0149)	-0.0890 (0.0565)	0.0503*** (0.0134)
powerfew		-0.0624** (0.0247)	
Olson			0.0758 (0.146)
Observations	20,459	4,208	16,207

Coefficients on other explanatory variables are not reported. All columns include country and year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.